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Abstract
This paper studies a model in which a low monetary policy rate
lowers the cost of capital for firms, thereby spurring productive in-
vestment. Low interest rates also induce firms to lever up so as to
increase payouts to shareholders. Whereas such leveraged payouts
privately benefit shareholders, they come at the social cost of reduc-
ing incentives to monitor firms, thereby degrading the quality of the
assets that back corporate debt. In the presence of an unregulated
shadow-banking system, the monetary authority has no choice but
stimulating investment below first-best levels in order to contain such
socially costly leveraged payouts.
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Introduction
Following the global financial crisis of 2007-08, most major central banks have
embarked upon so-called unconventional monetary policies. These policies
feature monetary easing aimed at keeping interest rates at ultra-low levels.
Most notably, the Federal Reserve kept for over eight years interest rates
at the zero lower-bound with large-scale asset purchases of Treasuries and
mortgage-backed securities. European Central Bank followed suit with such
purchases and so did the Bank of Japan.
These unconventional monetary policies have spurred debt issuance by
both financial institutions and non-financial corporations.
In the financial sector, the size of the shadow-banking system now exceeds
its 2008 peak. Non-bank financial institutions have increasingly engaged into
(unregulated) maturity transformation, rolling over short-term liabilities in
order to fund flows into risky asset classes that include junk bonds and collat-
eralized leveraged loans, residential mortgage-backed assets (Stein 2013), and
emerging-market government and corporate bonds (Acharya and Vij 2016,
Bruno and Shin 2014, Feroli et al. 2014). IMF GFSR (2016) documents
that the presence of such a “risk-taking channel” in the non-bank finance
(insurance companies, pension funds and asset managers) implies that mon-
etary policy remains potent in aﬀecting economic and financial outcomes
even when banks face strict macroeconomic regulation.
Non-financial corporations have also increasingly engaged into financial
risk-taking. The US corporate sector has raised $7.8 trillion in debt over
the 2010-2017 period, whereas net equity issuance has been negative due to
payouts to shareholders that are at a high point compared with historical
averages. As a result corporate leverage is close to historical highs for large
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firms1, and has more broadly risen to levels exceeding those prevailing just
before the global financial crisis, particularly so in the segment of leveraged
loans (IMF GFSR 2017, 2018).
Several observers and policymakers lament the disappointing impact of
such financial risk-taking on capital expenditures.2 Investment has not re-
turned yet to its pre-recession trends despite a large wedge between low in-
terest rates and historically high realized rates of return on existing capital.3
These high returns on capital have fuelled an increase in firms’ payout to
their shareholders, notably in the form of share repurchases (Furman 2015).
Motivated by these facts, this paper develops a model in which monetary
easing has a limited impact on productive investment. It spurs instead lever-
aged payouts that are socially costly because they negatively aﬀect firms’
incentives, therbey degrading the quality of their assets.
Gist of the argument. Suppose that an agent who values consumption
at two dates 0 and 1 is endowed with a technology that converts date-0
consumption units into date-1 units with decreasing marginal returns. The
agent is price-taker in a bond market. As the required return on bonds
decreases, the agent i) invests more in her technology until its marginal return
equates the return on bonds, and ii) borrows more against the resulting
date-1 output until so does her marginal rate of intertemporal substitution.
We deem such borrowing for consumption against future output a leveraged
payout. One interpretation of this trade is indeed that the agent sets a
corporation that operate her investment, and that this corporation issues
bonds, using the proceeds net of investment outlay either to buy back shares
1There is significant heterogeneity across sectors, but median net debt across S&P 500
firms is close to an all-time maximum.
2See, in particular, Rajan (2013).
3Return on capital measured as private capital income divided by the private capital
stock as in Furman (2015).
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from her or to pay her a special dividend.
Suppose now that the output from investment depends on costly private
eﬀort by the agent. Such moral hazard introduces a tension between invest-
ment and leveraged payouts as the interest rate decreases. On one hand, the
agent would like to enter into more leveraged payouts to front load consump-
tion. On the other hand, borrowing more against date-1 output reduces her
incentives, thereby making investment less profitable and thus smaller. The
agent sets her leverage at the level that optimally trades oﬀ consumption-
smoothing and incentives.
The central feature of our setup is that there is in equilibrium a large
wedge between this privately optimal trade-oﬀ and the socially optimal one.
In our model with heterogeneous agents, the early consumption that the most
impatient agents get out of such leveraged payouts is merely a welfare-neutral
transfer that they receive in equilibrium from more patient ones, whereas
their resulting reduced incentives are a pure social cost. This wedge induces
the monetary authority to target lower investment levels than it would in the
absence of moral hazard.
Our paper suggests a possible connection between two recent evolutions of
the US financial system. On one hand, a large unregulated shadow-banking
system has risen since the turn of the century. It now originates roughly
as much credit as traditional banking. On the other hand, Gutie´rrez and
Philippon (2017) note among others that, starting also in the early 2000s, US
fixed investment has been a decreasing fraction of firms’ profits despite a high
Tobin’s q, and that this coincided with an increase in share buybacks.4 In
our setup, the extent to which the public sector can regulate private leverage
4Gutie´rrez and Philippon (2017) argue that this evolution owes to a decline in the degree
of competition in US product markets. We view this explanation as complementary to
ours.
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drives the extent to which monetary easing spurs leveraged payouts instead of
productive investment, or, in the language of the IMF (2017), favors financial
risk-taking over economic risk-taking.
The paper is organized as follows. As a stepping stone, Section 1 presents
a partial-equilibrium model of optimal investment and consumption-smoothing
in the presence of moral hazard. Section 2 embeds it in a full-fledged equi-
librium model and derives the main results. Section 3 discusses the results
and presents concluding remarks.
Related literature
Our paper relates to recent contributions to three strands of literature.
First, Bolton et al. (2016) or Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2017) oﬀer
like us models in which a low cost of capital may be detrimental to incentives
in the private sector. Whereas a low cost of capital is due to positive shocks
on the supply of savings in their setup (“savings glut”), it stems from an
endogenous and optimal monetary-policy decision in a closed economy in
our setup.
Second, we argue in this paper that this relation between cost of capital
and incentives explains why low policy rates may fail to stimulate invest-
ment. Several recent contributions suggest alternative causes for this failure.
Brunnermeier and Koby (2018) show that this may stem from eroded lend-
ing margins in an environment of imperfectly competitive banks. Coimbra
and Rey (2017) study a model in which the financial sector is comprised of
institutions with varying risk appetites. Starting from a low interest rate,
further monetary easing may increase financial instability, thereby creating
a trade-oﬀ with the need to stimulate the economy. A distinctive feature of
our approach is that we jointly explain low investment and high corporate
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payouts.
Finally, we show how monetary easing, even when optimal, may come
with financial instability in the form of the socially useless issuance of debt
backed by low-quality assets. Several recent contributions highlight like us
the negative impact of low policy rates on financial stability. In Farhi and
Tirole (2012), the central bank cannot commit not to lower interest rates
when financial sector’s maturity transformation goes awry. In anticipation,
the financial sector finds it optimal to engage in maturity transformation
to exploit the central bank’s “put”. In Diamond and Rajan (2012), the
rollover risk in short-term claims disciplines banks from excessive maturity
transformation, but the inability of the central bank to commit not to “bail-
ing out” short-term claims removes the market discipline, inducing excessive
illiquidity-seeking by banks. They propose raising rates in good times taking
account of financial-stability concerns, so as to avoid distortions from having
to raise rates when banks are distressed. In contrast to these papers, in our
model, the central bank faces no commitment problem. The crowding out of
productive real investment by leveraged payouts is an ex-ante second-best.
1 Cost of capital, investment, and leveraged
payouts
Consider an economy with a single consumption good and two dates indexed
by t ∈ {0; 1}. An entrepreneur has access to an investment technology that
transforms I date-0 consumption units into a number of date-1 units equal
to f(I) with probability e and to zero with the complementary probability,
where f satisfies the Inada conditions. The entrepreneur controls the prob-
ability of success of his investment e at a private cost e2f(I)/(2π) that is
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subtracted from his date-0 utility over consumption, where π ∈ (0, 1). The
entrepreneur is risk neutral over consumption at dates 0 and 1 and does not
discount date-1 consumption at date 0. He has a large date-0 endowment of
the consumption good W > 0. He can trade securities with counterparties
that require a gross expected return r > 0.
The rest of this section solves for the entrepreneur’s utility-maximization
problem, discussing in turn the cases in which the entrepreneur’s cost of
capital r is larger or smaller than his (unit) discount rate.
Suppose first that r ≥ 1. The entrepreneur in this case uses his own
date-0 resources to fund the investment I in his technology f , and invests
the residual W − I in securities earning the expected return r. He selects the
investment I and eﬀort level e that solve
max
e,I
󰀝󰀕
e− e
2
2π
󰀖
f(I) + r(W − I)
󰀞
(1)
maximized at
e = π,
π
2
f ′(I) = r. (2)
In this case r ≥ 1, the probability of success π does not depend on the cost
of capital r. Both investment I and expected output πf(I) decrease with
respect to r.
Leveraged payouts. Consider now the case in which r < 1. Given his unit
discount factor, the entrepreneur would like to borrow at the rate r against
the date-1 consumption that he can generate out of his technology f . Such
borrowing is akin to a leveraged payout, whereby the entrepreneur sets up a
firm that runs the investment in the technology f at date 0, and then lets
this firm borrow against its expected future cash flows to buy back shares
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from the entrepreneur or pay him a special dividend.5
Such borrowing backed by future output however distorts the entrepreneur’s
incentives to exert eﬀort. The entrepreneur optimally trades oﬀ early con-
sumption and incentives by selecting an investment level I, an eﬀort level e,
and a leverage 1 − x against his output, where x ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of
the output against which he does not borrow—the “skin in the game”—that
solve
max
e,I,x
󰀝
(1− x)ef(I)
r
+W − I +
󰀕
xe− e
2
2π
󰀖
f(I)
󰀞
(3)
s.t.
e = argmax
y
󰀝
xy − y
2
2π
󰀞
. (4)
Condition (4) is the incentive-compatibility constraint. The first-order con-
ditions are
e = πx =
π
2− r ,
πf ′(I)
2(2− r) = r. (5)
They imply that in this range, a lower cost of capital r induces an increase
in leveraged payouts (a lower value of x). Furthermore, since a lower r
induces both a lower probability of success e = π/(2 − r) and a higher
investment I = f ′−1(2r(2 − r)/π), the overall impact of a reduction in r on
expected output ef(I) is ambiguous. Suppose for analytical simplicity that
f(I) = γI1/γ, where γ > 1. We show in the appendix that the expected
output actually increases in r for r ∈ [2/(γ + 1), 1], and decreases otherwise.
5Dividends and share buybacks are equivalent in this environment that abstracts from
tax considerations.
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The following proposition collects the above results.
Proposition 1. (Cost of capital, investment, and leveraged pay-
outs) Let r(r) = min{r; 1}. The entrepreneur chooses investment I, eﬀort
e, and skin in the game x such that
e = πx =
π
2− r(r) ,
πf ′(I)
2(2− r(r)) = r. (6)
Thus,
• For r ∈ (1,+∞), a reduction in the cost of capital r is irrelevant for
corporate leverage, payout policy, and incentives. It spurs investment
and expected output.
• For r < 1, a reduction in the cost of capital r spurs leveraged payouts
that reduce the entrepreneur’s incentives and thus degrade asset quality.
Investment is less sensitive to r than in the case r > 1. Expected output
actually increases with respect to r if r ∈ [2/(γ + 1), 1).
Proof. See the appendix. 󰃈
The entrepreneur’s linear preferences induce a sharp diﬀerence between
the two cases discussed in Proposition 1. This permits a clear and simple
exposition of the important intuition behind our results.6 In the case r > 1,
fluctuations in the cost of capital only aﬀect corporate investment I. When
r < 1, by contrast, the cost of capital aﬀects corporate leverage as well,
even though the entrepreneur has all the internal liquidity W needed for
investment. Leveraged payouts reduce incentives and thus shift the entire
production function downwards, so much so that a reduction in the cost of
capital actually comes with a reduction in expected output for r ∈ (2/(γ +
6The broad qualitative insights would clearly carry over under strict concavity.
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1), 1]. Thus, the interplay of consumption smoothing and moral hazard with
a standard investment problem simply generates the stylized facts described
in the introduction.
Cost of capital and realized return on capital. Suppose that the
economy may be at date 1 in two states, “normal times” or “crisis”. Whereas
the entrepreneur’s project always succeeds in normal times, it may fail during
a crisis. The entrepreneur has no control over the probability of occurence
of a crisis but can reduce his failure rate when it occurs by exerting eﬀort.
An econometrician interested in the gap between realized return on capital
and interest rate would observe the ratio f ′(I)/r in normal times. This ratio
f ′I)/r = 2/π does not depend on r when r ≥ 1, whereas it decreases with
respect to r for r < 1 from (5). This latter situation is in line with the fact
mentioned in the introduction that the gap between realized return on capital
and interest rate has reached historical highs in the recent environment of
historically low interest rates.
The next section embeds this partial-equilibrium model with exogenous
cost of capital into a model in which a central bank with full fiscal backing
controls the real rate and thus firms’ cost of capital. The central bank seeks
to maximize a standard social welfare function, and sets its policy rate so as
to mitigate the distortions induced by rigid wages.
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2 Investment, leveraged payouts, and opti-
mal monetary policy
2.1 Setup
Time is discrete. There is a single consumption good that serves as nume´raire.
There are two types of private agents, workers and entrepreneurs, and a pub-
lic sector.
Workers. At each date, a unit mass of workers are born and live for two
dates. They derive utility from consumption only when old, and are risk-
neutral over consumption at this date. Each worker supplies inelastically one
unit of labor when young in a competitive labor market. Each worker also
owns a technology that transforms l units of labor into g(l) contemporaneous
units of the consumption good.
Entrepreneurs. At each date, a unit mass of entrepreneurs are born and
live for two dates. Entrepreneurs are essentially identical to that in the
previous section. They are risk-neutral over consumption at each date and
do not discount future consumption. They are born with a large endowment
W of the nume´raire good.7 Each entrepreneur born at date t is endowed with
a technology that transforms l units of labor at date t into f(l) consumption
units at the next date t + 1 with probability e, and zero units with the
complementary probability. Entrepreneurs control the probability of success
e at a private cost e2f(l)/(2π) that is subtracted from their utility when
young.
The technology f features a lag between production and delivery of con-
sumption services. This technology thus stands in our stylized model for the
7We could endogenize this endowment as labor income at some additional complexity
and without gaining insights.
11
most interest-sensitive sectors of the economy such as durable-good, housing
or capital-good sectors.8 We accordingly deem firms using technology f the
capital-good sector and that using g the consumption-good sector.
The functions f and g are increasing, strictly concave, twice diﬀerentiable
over [0,+∞), and such that lim0 f ′ = lim0 g′ = +∞.
Public sector. The public sector does not consume. It maximizes the
sum of the utilities of agents in the private sector, discounting that of future
generations with a factor arbitrarily close to 1.
Bond market. There is a competitive market for one-period bonds denom-
inated in the nume´raire good.
Monetary policy. The public sector announces at each date an expected
return at which it is willing to trade arbitrary quantities of bonds.
Fiscal policy. The public sector can tax workers as it sees fit. It can,
in particular, apply lump-sum taxes. On the other hand, it cannot tax en-
trepreneurs. This latter assumption is made stark in order to yield a simple
and clear exposition of our results.
Relationship to new Keynesian models. This setup can be described
as a much simplified version of a new Keynesian model in which money
serves only as a unit of account (“cashless economy”) and monetary policy
consists in enforcing the short-term nominal interest rate. Such monetary
policy has real eﬀects in the presence of nominal rigidities. We entirely focus
on these real eﬀects, and fully abstract from price-level determination by
assuming extreme nominal rigidities in the form of a fixed price level for
the consumption good. This will enable us to introduce ingredients that are
typically absent from mainstream monetary models in a tractable framework
8A full-fledged model of f as a capital-good technology would require that the date-t
investment be combined with labor at date t+ 1 in order to generate consumption. This
would complicate the analysis without adding substantial insights.
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in the following. In recent contributions, Benmelech and Bergman (2012),
Caballero and Simsek (2017) or Farhi and Tirole (2012) also focus on the
financial-stability implications of monetary policy abstracting from price-
level determination as we do.
2.2 Steady-state
We first study steady-states in which the public sector announces a constant
gross interest rate r at each date. We suppose that the public sector oﬀsets its
net position in the bond market at each date with a lump-sum tax or rebate
on current old workers. We denote w ≥ 0 the steady-state wage, and l ∈ [0, 1]
the steady-state quantity of labor used by entrepreneurs. The steady-state
associated with a policy rate r can then be characterized as follows.
Entrepreneurs. Each entrepreneur’s problem is identical to that in Section
1.9 As in Section 1, we denote x the skin in the game of an entrepreneur and
r(r) = min{r; 1}. Each entrepreneur’s objective is then
max
e,l,x
󰀝
(1 + r − r(r))
󰀗
(1− x)ef(l)
r
+W − wl
󰀘
+
󰀕
xe− e
2
2π
󰀖
f(l)
󰀞
(7)
s.t.
e = argmax
y
󰀝
xy − y
2
2π
󰀞
. (8)
Expression (7) for entrepreneurs’ surplus subsumes (1) and (3), taking into
account that x = 1 is optimal when r ≥ 1. From Proposition 1, each en-
9Up to the change of variable I = wl.
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trepreneur chooses e, x, and l such that
x =
1
2− r(r) , e = πx,
πf ′(l)
2(2− r(r)) = rw. (9)
Furthermore, taking again into account that x = 1 whenever r ≥ 1, one can
write an entreprenur’s net position in the bond market when young as:
{r≥1}(W − wl)− (1− x)ef(l)
r
. (10)
Workers. Young workers’ income is comprised of labor income in the
capital-good sector wl, labor income in the consumption-good sector w(1−l),
and profits from the consumption-good sector g(1−l)−w(1−l). These latter
profits are maximum when
g′(1− l) = w. (11)
Since they consume only when old, workers invest the resulting total in-
come g(1 − l) + wl in the bond market thereby receiving a pre-tax income
r[g(1 − l) + wl] when old. The government rebates as a lump-sum to old
workers the investment in public bonds by contemporaneous young workers
and entrepreneurs net of the repayment of maturing bonds.
Equations (9) and (11) uniquely determine the steady-state values of
(x, e, l, w) for a given interest rate r. The surplus of a given cohort is for
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such an interest rate:
(1 + r − r(r))
󰀕
(1− x)ef(l)
r
+W − wl
󰀖
+
󰀕
xe− e
2
2π
󰀖
f(l)󰁿 󰁾󰁽 󰂀
Entrepreneurs’ surplus
+ rwl + rg(1− l)󰁿 󰁾󰁽 󰂀
Old workers’ pre-tax income
+ (1− r)
󰀗
{r≥1}(W − wl)− (1− x)ef(l)
r
+ g(1− l) + wl
󰀘
󰁿 󰁾󰁽 󰂀
Rebate to old workers
(12)
= W +
󰀕
e− e
2
2π
󰀖
f(l) + g(1− l). (13)
An important remark is in order before solving for the optimal steady-
state interest rate. Note from expression (13) that the interest rate r aﬀects
social surplus only through its impact on the values of e and l that en-
trepreneurs choose in equilibrium. Entrepreneurs’ surplus by contrast also
directly depends on r from (8). In particular, when r < 1, entrepreneurs
directly benefit from lower interest rates through higher leveraged payouts
when young. Proposition 1 describes how they optimally trade oﬀ the ben-
efits from such leveraged payouts with the costs of reduced incentives. Ex-
pression (13) shows that this trade-oﬀ is privately but not socially optimal,
however. Reduced incentives are social costs whereas early consumption
from early payouts are only transfers from old workers towards young en-
trepreneurs that are neutral given the assumed social welfare function. In
short, leveraged payouts are in this model a form of ineﬃcient rent extrac-
tion by entrepreneurs that is detrimental both to savers and to asset quality.
The following quote by Andrew Sorkin (2010) reflecting on the monetary
remedies to the 2008 crisis epitomizes this mechanism:
“It doesn’t help that the economic medicine used by policymakers after a
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crisis exacerbates those feelings of anger. The most eﬃcient fix—lowering
interest rates—helps the wealthy because they end up with cheaper mortgages
and enjoy the benefits that low rates have on corporate growth. Those lower
on the economic ladder, on the other hand, get little in interest on their
savings. The gap between the haves and the have-nots widens. But that
approach actually works, pulling everyone along with it, even if it is uneven
and there are greater beneficiaries than others.”
We now solve for the optimal steady-state interest rate. Expression (13)
implies that the public sector optimally seeks to implement (e∗, l∗) such that
e∗ = π and πf ′(l∗)/2 = g′(1− l∗). Given that profit maximization implies
g′(1− l) = w (14)
in the consumption-good sector and
πf ′(l)
2(2− r(r)) = rw (15)
in the capital-good one, the public sector can reach (e∗, l∗) by setting the rate
r∗ = 1. The optimality of an interest rate equal to the (unit) growth rate of
the population is of course akin to the “golden rule” maximizing steady-state
utility in overlapping-generations models. Note that at this unit optimal rate,
inflows and outflows in the bond market exactly oﬀset each other so that the
net rebate to old workers is zero.
2.3 Monetary easing
Suppose now that one cohort of workers — the one born at date 0, say —
has a less productive technology than that of its predecessors and successors.
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Unlike the other cohorts, their technology transforms x units of labor into
ρg(x) contemporaneous units of the consumption good, where ρ ∈ (0, 1). We
study the implications of such a time-varying productivity for optimal policy
and welfare in three diﬀerent contexts with incremental frictions:
1. The wage is flexible.
2. The wage is downward rigid and the public sector can regulate private
leverage.
3. The wage is downward rigid and the public sector cannot regulate pri-
vate leverage.
2.3.1 Flexible-wage benchmark
Proposition 2. (Laissez-faire is optimal when the wage is flexible)
If the wage is flexible, the public sector implements the first-best by setting
the interest rate at the steady-state level r∗ = 1 at each date. At this rate
there is no need to regulate leverage.
The cohort born at date −1 subsidizes that born at date 0. There are no
other transfers across cohorts.
Proof. Let us introduce ρt = 1 + (ρ − 1) {t=0}. We use the subscripted
notation (et, xt, lt, wt, rt) to denote the values of (e, x, l, w, r) for the cohort
born at date t out of the steady-state.
The social welfare function assigns the same weight to every unit of consump-
tion no matter who consumes it and when, and to private costs of eﬀort no
matter when they are incurred. The first-best is thus reached when
󰀕
et − e
2
t
2π
󰀖
f(lt) + ρtg(1− lt) (16)
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is maximum for all t, or
et = π, ρtg
′(1− lt) = πf ′(lt)/2. (17)
With a flexible wage, setting rt = 1 for all t implements the first-best because
this induces xt = 1, and profit maximization in both sectors and labor-market
clearing imply
et = π, (18)
ρtg
′(1− lt) = wt = rtwt = πf ′(lt)/2, (19)
which characterizes the first-best from (17).
The proof that the only transfer across cohorts is that from the date-(-1)
cohort towards the date-0 one is in the appendix. 󰃈
When the wage is flexible, the steady-state unit interest rate r∗ = 1
is unsurprisingly still optimal at all dates in the presence of time-varying
productivity. From (19), the date-0 wage adjusts to a level w0 < w
∗ such
that the employment level in the capital-good sector l0 > l
∗ leads to more
investment, and this maximizes the contribution of the date-0 cohort to total
output. For the remainder of the paper, we respectively denote lρ and wρ
this first-best date-0 employment level and the associated market wage in
this case of a flexible wage.
Time-varying productivity only has a redistributive eﬀect across the co-
horts born at −1 and 0 that is immaterial given our social welfare function.
The savings of agents born at date 0 and thus facing a less productive econ-
omy do not suﬃce to repay the bonds of old date-(-1) agents that are due at
date 0, and so these latter old agents must pay a tax. Workers born at date
0 conversely receive a matching rebate once old at date 1, as savings from
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date-1 born agents are back to the higher steady-state value.
2.3.2 Rigid wage and regulated leverage
We now introduce a friction in this economy in the form of nominal rigidities:
Assumption. (Downward-rigid wage) The wage cannot be smaller than
the steady-state wage w∗ at date 0.
In other words, we suppose that the wage is too downward rigid to track
the transitory negative productivity shock that hits the date-0 cohort, and
that the public sector cannot regulate it in the short run.10
We also suppose here that the public sector not only sets the interest rate
at each date and taxes workers, but can also control entrepreneurs’ lever-
age.11 The following proposition shows that in this case, the combination of
a reduction in the date-0 interest rate and of a prudential regulation enforc-
ing that entrepreneurs do not borrow at this date implements the first-best,
albeit through higher date-0 transfers from old to young agents than under
a flexible wage.
Proposition 3. (Monetary easing and prudential regulation imple-
ment the first-best) The public sector implements the first-best outcome
with the following policy:
• It sets r∗ = 1 at all other dates than 0 (and thus need not regulate
leverage at these dates)
10We could also assume a partial wage adjustment without aﬀecting the analysis. Note
also that the analysis would be similar if the date-0 productivity shock was permanent
(“secular stagnation”). All that would matter in this case would be the number of periods
it takes for the wage to adjust to the level that is optimal given the productivity shock.
11We could alternatively assume that the public sector can tax capital income at no cost
and without restrictions.
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• It sets rρ = wρ/w < 1 at date 0 and imposes xρ = 1 to young date-0
entrepreneurs.
The cohort born at date −1 subsidizes that born at date 0, more so than
under flexible wage. There are no other transfers across cohorts.
Proof. First-order conditions for profit maximization (14) and (15) show
that the capital-good sector is interest-rate sensitive whereas the consumption-
good sector is not. The public sector can accordingly make up for the absence
of appropriate price signals in the date-0 labor market by distorting the date-
0 capital market. By setting the date-0 policy rate at
rρ =
wρ
w∗
< 1, (20)
and imposing xρ = 1 at date 0, the public sector implements the flexible-wage
outcome in the labor market. Entrepreneurs invest up to the optimal level lρ
since they face under this policy the same first-order condition as when the
wage is flexible and r∗ = 1:
π
2
f ′(lρ) = rρw∗ = wρ. (21)
Each worker accommodates by applying in his own firm the residual quantity
of labor that he cannot sell on the labor market at the disequilibrium wage
w∗. He does so at a marginal return below wage (ρg′(1 − lρ) = wρ < w∗),
and produces at the socially optimal level by doing so. 󰃈
Note that the combination of date-0 monetary easing and leverage regu-
lation maximizes the social welfare function, but that it implies more subsidy
to young date-0 entrepreneurs from contemporaneous old workers. This owes
to the fact that such young entrepreneurs, facing a rate rρ < 1, prefer to con-
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sume their endowment when young rather than saving it, and the public
sector must make up for this lower demand for bonds with higher date-0
taxes on old workers.
2.3.3 Rigid wage and unregulated leverage
Suppose now that the public sector no longer has the ability to regulate
entrepreneurs’ leverage. As detailed below, this corresponds to an economy
in which a significant fraction of credit activity takes place in an unregulated
shadow-banking system. The following proposition shows that this induces
a lack of investment that puts the first-best out of reach.
Proposition 4. (Rigid wage and unregulated leverage)
1. The optimal interest rates are r∗ = 1 at all other dates than 0 and
ru ≤ 1 at date 0.
2. Surplus is strictly lower and date-0 entrepreneurs use a quantity of labor
lu strictly smaller than that in the case of flexible wage lρ.
3. If ρ is suﬃciently close to 1 other things being equal then ru = 1 > rρ.
4. Suppose f(l) = γl1/γ where γ > 1. If ρ and γ are suﬃciently small
other things being equal then ru < rρ.
5. The cohort born at date −1 subsidizes that born at date 0, more so than
under rigid wage and regulated leverage. There are no other transfers
across cohorts.
Proof. See the appendix. 󰃈
From (9), in the absence of leverage regulation, the skin in the game of
an entrepreneur x and thus his eﬀort e (strictly) increase in r for r < 1. As
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a result, attempts at spurring investment/employment in the capital-good
sector with a reduction in the date-0 interest rate boost leveraged payouts
and degrade asset quality. This unintended consequence of monetary easing
implies that social surplus is maximized at a lower date-0 use of labor lu
in the capital-good sector than in the presence of a prudential regulation
imposing x = 1: lu < lρ. In this sense, lack of investment relative to the
first-best is part of a second-best policy in the absence of a strict prudential
regulation.
Interestingly, whether the optimal date-0 interest rate ru—the one that
leads entrepreneurs to choose lu—is lower or higher than the optimal date-0
rate in the presence of regulated leverage rρ is unclear. On the one hand,
employment in the capital-good sector is less sensitive to the interest rate
when leverage is unregulated, which implies setting a lower interest rate when
leverage is unregulated than when it is in order to reach a given target level for
l.12 We just stated on the other hand that the target for employment in the
capital-good sector should be lower in the absence of leverage regulation—
lu < lρ, which goes in the direction of setting ru > rρ as less stimulation
is needed. The latter eﬀect is dominant in the case of small productivity
shocks (large values of ρ, point 3. in the proposition) whereas the former
one prevails for large shocks provided f is not too concave (point 4. in the
proposition).
Finally, monetary easing is anti-redistributive in the sense that date-0
leveraged payouts by young entrepreneurs lead to an issuance of corporate
debt that crowds out public bonds and forces the public sector to raise more
taxes on old workers than under regulated leverage.
Overall, these results suggest that the rise of a large unregulated shadow-
12In the absence of leverage regulation l is reached by setting r such that πf ′(l) =
2w∗r(2− r) whereas r is such that πf ′(l) = 2rw∗ for x = 1.
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banking sector can significantly aﬀect the impact of monetary easing on the
mix of financial risk taking and investment, as well as on redistribution.
3 Discussion and concluding remarks
Zero lower bound and asset purchases
In the face of a zero lower bound (ZLB) on policy rates, the Federal Reserve
has responded to the 2008 crisis with unconventional policies that include
the purchase of private claims such as mortgage-related securities. Suppose
that the public sector is subject to a similar ZLB in our setup: It cannot
set the date-0 rate below r∗ = 1.13 The public sector can still enter into
asset purchases, swapping date-0 entrepreneurs’ claims to their date-1 output
with public bonds akin to remunerated excess reserves. Such swaps spur
investment at date 0: If the public sector trades 1/r0 bonds for each date-
1 consumption unit, then this amounts to grant a lower interest rate to
date-0 entrepreneurs. Such asset purchases however have the same adverse
implications for incentives as interest-rate reductions because they reduce
entrepreneurs’ skin in the game in the very same way.
Shadow banking
As mentioned in the introduction, both non-financial corporations and the
financial sector have responded to post 2008 monetary easing with large debt
issuances. The size of the shadow-banking sector in particular, after a sharp
contraction in 2007-8, now exceeds pre-crisis levels.
There is no room for financial intermediation in our setup, and so we
13For example, because the private sector can secretly store with a unit gross return.
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aggregate for conciseness financial and non-financial firms into one single
private sector.14 In this context we interpret the respective polar cases of
regulated (Section 2.3.2) and unregulated (Section 2.3.3)leverage as respec-
tively the situation in which the financial sector is mostly comprised of banks
subject to prudential regulation and that in which a large shadow-banking
sector operates. An interesting route for future research consists in studying
the intermediate situation in which the regulation of leverage can only be
imperfectly enforced, and examining the interplay of such imperfect enforce-
ment with the crowding out of investment by financial risk-taking highlighted
here.15
Although the mechanism in his setup diﬀers from ours,16 Stein (2012) ex-
plains that the prudential regulation of banks can partly rein in incentives to
engage in socially suboptimal financial risk-taking; however, there is always
some unchecked growth of such activity in shadow banking, and monetary
policy that leans against the wind can be optimal as it raises the cost of
borrowing in all “cracks” of the financial sector. This resonates with our
result that the optimal policy response to small productivity shocks consists
in being passive and setting r∗ = 1.
Our attempt in this paper has been to embed financial-stability concerns
in a workhorse model of the interest-rate channel of monetary policy. We
show that a standard-moral hazard problem combined with loose prudential
regulation creates a very natural link between the recently observed lack of
real investment and surge in leveraged payouts. There are many directions in
14We could introduce financial intermediaries in a two-tiered incentives problem as in
Holmstro¨m and Tirole 1997.
15Plantin (2015) develops a model of leverage regulation under imperfect enforcement.
16Banks in his paper engage in maturity transformation that is socially suboptimal due
to fire-sale externalities
24
which we could extend our analysis fruitfully. For example, we could intro-
duce long-term projects and incomplete bond markets in order to generate
maturity transformation. “Carry trades”—the rollover of short-term debt to
fund long-term cash flows— would then potentially build up in the economy
over an extended period of monetary easing and face an endogenous rollover
risk when rates rise. Adding such a feature to the model would allow us to
relate in a better fashion to phenomena in asset markets and financial flows
as observed during the “taper tantrum” in 2013 (Feroli et al. 2014).
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The case r ≥ 1 is straightforward and derived in the body of the paper. In
the case r < 1, in order to derive the conditions in (5), notice first that (4)
implies e = πx. Plugging this into (3), the objective becomes
πx[2− (2− r)x]
2r
f(I) +W − I, (22)
and first-order conditions with respect to x and I yield the two remaining
conditions in (5).
Suppose f(I) = γI1/γ. When r < 1, the expected output is
ef(I) =
󰀕
π
2− r
󰀖 γ
γ−1
󰀕
1
2r
󰀖 1
γ−1
, (23)
and standard derivation yields its variations with respect to r. 󰃈
Proof of Proposition 2
The only result that is not established in the body of the paper regards
transfers across cohorts. For any t, in the absence of leverage regulation, the
surplus of a date-t cohort is
(1 + rt − r(rt))
󰀗
(1− xt)etf(lt)
rt
+W − wtlt
󰀘
+ rtwtlt + rtρtg(1− lt)+
{rt+1≥1}(W − wt+1lt+1)−
(1− xt+1)et+1f(lt+1)
rt+1
+ wt+1lt+1 + ρt+1g(1− lt+1)
− rt
󰀗
wtlt + ρtg(1− lt) + {rt≥1}(W − wtlt)−
(1− xt)etf(lt)
rt
󰀘
(24)
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The first line in (24) is the consumption of entrepreneurs plus old workers’
pre-tax income. The next two lines are the lump-sum rebated to old workers,
comprised of the net savings of the next cohort (second line) minus the
repayment of outstanding bonds to the private sector (third line). Note that
we implicitly assume throughout the paper that the rebate to old workers,
when it is negative, can be financed by their pre-tax income. It is easy to
see that this is so as long as workers earn a suﬃciently large amount of total
income at each date.
From (24), straightforward computations show that under the optimal
policy, the surplus of each cohort born at any date t /∈ {−1; 0} is given by
W +
πf(l∗)
2
+ g(1− l∗), (25)
whereas that of cohort −1 is
W +
πf(l∗)
2
+ ρg(1− lρ), (26)
and that of cohort 0 equals
W +
πf(lρ)
2
+ g(1− l∗). (27)
Cohort −1 thus pays a subsidy equal to g(1− l∗)− ρg(1− lρ) to cohort 0. 󰃈
Proof of Proposition 3
From (24), and accounting for leverage regulation, straightforward computa-
tions show that the surplus of each cohort born at any date t /∈ {−1; 0} is
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given by
W +
πf(l∗)
2
+ g(1− l∗), (28)
whereas that of cohort −1 is
w∗lρ +
πf(l∗)
2
+ ρg(1− lρ), (29)
and that of cohort 0 equals
W +
πf(lρ)
2
+ g(1− l∗) +W − w∗lρ. (30)
Cohort −1 thus pays a subsidy equal to g(1− l∗)− ρg(1− lρ) +W −w∗lρ to
cohort 0, larger than under flexible wage. This is due to the fact that young
date-0 entrepreneurs are unwilling to save W − w∗lρ at the rate rρ < 1, and
prefer instead to consume this when young. This forces the public sector to
collect this additional amount from old date-0 workers. 󰃈
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof of points 1. and 2. Setting rt = 1 maximizes (16) for all t ∕= 0.
Regarding the date-0 cohort, the optimal rate r ≤ 1 maximizes
Σ(r) =
󰀕
e(r)− e(r)
2
2π
󰀖
f (l(r)) + ρg(l(r)), (31)
where relations (9) implicitly define e(r) and l(r). These functions are obvi-
ously diﬀerentiable with respect to r, respectively increasing and decreasing,
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and straightforward computations yield:
Σ′(r) =
π(1− r)f(l(r))
(2− r)3 +
󰀗
π(3− 2r)f ′(l(r))
2(2− r)2 − ρg
′(1− l(r))
󰀘
l′(r). (32)
For r′ρ such that l(r
′
ρ) = lρ, we have by definition of lρ that πf
′(l(r′ρ))/2 =
ρg′(1− l(r′ρ)), which implies
Σ′(r′ρ) =
π(1− r′ρ)f(l(r′ρ))
(2− r′ρ)3
− π
2
󰀕
1− r′ρ
2− r′ρ
󰀖2
f ′(l(r′ρ))l
′(r′ρ) > 0, (33)
implying in turn points 1. and 2. in the proposition (lu > lr).
Proof of point 3. Using
l′(r) =
4w∗(1− r)
πf ′′(l(r))
, (34)
one can write
Σ′(r) = (1− r)
󰀵󰀹󰀹󰀷πf(l(r))(2− r)3󰁿 󰁾󰁽 󰂀
A
+
4w∗
πf ′′(l(r))
󰀵󰀹󰀹󰀷π(3− 2r)f ′(l(r))2(2− r)2 − ρg′(1− l(r))󰁿 󰁾󰁽 󰂀
B
󰀶󰀺󰀺󰀸
󰀶󰀺󰀺󰀸
(35)
For (ρ, r) suﬃciently close to (1, 1), B becomes negligible relative to A and
so Σ′ > 0 over [r, 1). Furthermore, standard continuity arguments imply
that limρ↑1(ru, lu) = (1, l∗). That Σ′(ru) must therefore be strictly positive
for ρ suﬃciently close to 1 implies that (ru, lu) is actually equal to (1, l
∗) for
ρ suﬃciently close to 1. 󰃈
Proof of point 4. If f(l) = γl1/γ then f ′′(l) = (1/γ − 1)l1/γ−2. Thus, for
any fixed (r, l) ∈ (0, 1)2, there exists γ suﬃciently close to 1 and ρ suﬃciently
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close to 0 such that
πf(l)
(2− r)3 +
4w∗
πf ′′(l)
󰀗
π(3− 2r)f ′(l)
2(2− r)2 − ρg
′(1− l)
󰀘
< 0. (36)
It is easy to see that this implies that lu must become arbitrarily close to 1
for ρ and γ suﬃciently small. It is also clearly the case that lρ is arbitrarily
close to 1 for ρ and γ suﬃciently small. We have
πf ′(lu)
2(2− ru) = ruw
∗, (37)
πf ′(lρ)
2
= rρw
∗, (38)
and so it must also be that ru < rρ for ρ and γ suﬃciently small.
Proof of point 5. From (24), straightforward computations show that the
surplus of each cohort born at any date t /∈ {−1; 0} is given by
W +
πf(l∗)
2
+ g(1− l∗), (39)
whereas that of cohort −1 is
w∗lu +
πf(l∗)
2
+ ρg(1− lu)− π(1− ru)f(lu)
ru(2− ru)2 , (40)
and that of cohort 0 equals
W +
πf(lρ)
2
+ g(1− l∗) +W − w∗lu + π(1− ru)f(lu)
ru(2− ru)2 . (41)
Cohort −1 thus pays a subsidy equal to g(1− l∗)− ρg(1− lu) +W −w∗lu +
π(1 − ru)f(lu)/[ru(2 − ru)2] to cohort 0, larger than under rigid wage and
regulated leverage. This is due to the fact that young date-0 entrepreneurs
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consume an additional π(1 − ru)f(lu)/[ru(2 − ru)2] when young borrowed
against their date-1 output, which forces the public sector to collect this
additional amount from old date-0 workers. 󰃈
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